

**TOP SECRET**

ED

5 May 1958

Copy No. 140

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 4  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  
UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 3/26/80 REVIEWER: [ ]

State Dept. review completed

**TOP SECRET**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 May 1958

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*yes* Hungary: A Hungarian commentary on the Yugoslav party program specifically endorses "the right of the Yugoslav party to follow its road." This deviation from Moscow's current public position on the Yugoslav party program suggests that Kadar now may be trying to follow in Gomulka's steps--emphasizing a degree of independence from Moscow--in an effort to gain some measure of national popularity for himself and his regime. The fact that the Hungarian comment, first published in the party's theoretical journal, was reprinted in the party's daily newspaper is unusual.

East Germany: The growing shortage of manpower in East Germany will probably be accentuated in 1958 by an increase in the number of peasants fleeing to the West. The farmers are stubbornly resisting agricultural collectivization, which is being pushed at such an increased pace that 675 new cooperatives were formed during the first quarter of 1958 as compared with 520 for all of 1957. Between 35

and 40 percent of East German farmland is collectivized,  
and the regime hopes to achieve a total of 50 percent by  
1960.

25X1

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

5 May 58

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] South Korea: In the 2 May assembly elections, President Rhee's Liberals have gained enough seats to command a working majority but not the two-thirds needed to deprive opposition Democratic Vice President Chang Myon of his right of succession. Reports from observers in South Korea indicate the elections were relatively free as compared with previous voting in the country. [REDACTED]

25X1

### III. THE WEST

France: Mollet's declaration that he will not reverse his Socialist party's decision against participating in a new

5 May 58

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

French government "even if the political crisis lasts eight weeks" will discourage further candidates for the premiership from the center parties whom President Coty had counted on to bridge the gulf between the non-Communist left and the rightists. [REDACTED]

25X1

*ye* Guatemala: Disillusionment with President Ydigoras and criticism of his failure to take positive action on any major domestic problem has grown rapidly in the two months since his inauguration. While no immediate threat to the government is apparent, continuation of the present trend would further enhance growing leftist strength and could imperil Ydigoras' chances of completing his six-year term.

[REDACTED]

25X1

5 May 58

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1



### Hungarian Party Journal Endorses Yugoslav "Separate Road"

A Hungarian commentary on the Yugoslav party program initially published in the party's theoretical journal specifically endorses "the right of the Yugoslav party to follow its own road," although it echoes the Moscow Kommunist article in condemning various Yugoslav deviations from Soviet theoretical positions. This unusual departure from Moscow's current public position on a key issue concerning Soviet-Yugoslav relations suggests that Kadar may be seeking popular support for himself and his regime by trying to follow in the steps of Poland's Gomulka--by emphasizing his independence from Moscow.

The subsequent reprinting of this article in the Hungarian party's daily newspaper is unusual. The new Hungarian line may even be designed to soften present Soviet-Yugoslav ideological disagreement. For example, it expressly answers Yugoslav fears of a new Cominform by declaring: "No party can be compelled to submit itself either in theoretical or practical issues to the decisions of international forums." Other statements may be designed to lessen Yugoslav objections to Soviet leadership of the "socialist world order" and to justify Yugoslavia's failure to join the "socialist camp" as well as its acceptance of loans from the West.

The publication of these pro-Yugoslav views in Hungary may spark further internal party contention, since Moscow-oriented hard-line elements are likely to be seriously concerned if they believe this article to be a concession by Kadar on the key issue of Soviet leadership of the bloc. It is notable, however, that no adverse comment has been observed in the bloc press to date.

25X1

25X1

25X1



### East German Campaign Against the Farmer

The socialization of East German private farmland is continuing at a rapid rate. During the first quarter of 1958, 675 new cooperatives were formed, compared with 520 established during all of 1957. The regime intends to socialize at least 50 percent of East Germany's agricultural land by 1960--the current proportion is 35-40 percent--despite decreasing manpower to work the socialist acreage as the program develops.

A heavy propaganda campaign is accompanying regime efforts to bring private farmers under state control, but peasant resistance to these blandishments is stubborn. The outspoken reaction of the farmers to the campaign indicates that East Germany's shortage of manpower will be accentuated by continued flights of farmers to the West.

A recent authoritative Soviet article on satellite collectivization indicates that regime leaders are again, as under Stalin, being urged to take whatever risks are necessary in order to push agricultural collectivization as rapidly as possible.

25X1  
25X1

25X1

**Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

### South Korean Election Results

By winning a total of 121 seats in the 233-member South Korean assembly, President Syngman Rhee's Liberal party has gained a comfortable working majority which should prevent legislative deadlocks. The Liberals, however, have not gained enough strength to command a two-thirds majority, even with the aid of independents, and thus to enable them to pass a constitutional amendment depriving opposition Democratic Vice President Chang Myon of his right of succession.

The Democrats increased their representation in the assembly, but fell short of the gains many experienced observers had anticipated. Last-minute promises by the Liberals to introduce various public welfare measures after the election may have cut into the Democratic vote.

Although the Democrats have charged that the elections were conducted unfairly, few instances of violence or police intimidation appear to have occurred. Press reports indicate that the election was the quietest in the republic's history. The "soft" tactics employed by Liberal party chairman Yi Ki-pung apparently were successful.

Liberal morale undoubtedly has been bolstered considerably by the election results, and the interest of some Liberal politicians in effecting a rapprochement with the opposition Democrats probably will lessen. Liberal party discipline unquestionably has been strengthened, as has the two-party system in Korea.

25X1

25X1

25X1

### III. THE WEST

#### Guatemalan Public Becoming Disillusioned With New President

Two months after his inauguration, Guatemalan President Ydigoras has yet to show the able leadership expected of him. He has thus far failed to come to grips with any major economic or political problem, and his exploitation of Guatemala's century-old claim to British Honduras has been recognized by influential segments of the press as a purely diversionary tactic. Disillusionment with the new administration is growing among some politicians and army officers, and the general public is becoming apprehensive. While no immediate threat to the government is apparent, continuation of the present drift would seriously imperil Ydigoras' chances of completing his six-year term and further enhance growing leftist strength.

In Congress, where the pro-Ydigoras minority has been continually on the defensive and has shown little initiative or ability, the show is being stolen by the small but able and aggressive bloc of the leftist Revolutionary party (PR). The resurgent political left has made such gains in recent months, after three years of suppression, that many observers feel that the PR would win overwhelmingly if elections were held now. The Communists, already quietly active in the PR's lower echelons, hope to gain increased influence during the party convention scheduled for next month. Even if maneuvering between the party's current moderate leadership and the pro-Communist faction results in a split in the party, leftists will probably continue to enjoy nearly ideal conditions for further gains until the administration shows firm leadership and adopts a program with popular appeal.

25X1

25X1

25X1